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1962/11/02

CUBA: INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS

Nov. 2 1962

We do not yet know whether Cuba will be willing voluntarily to have international inspection on his soil, either to justify dismantling and removal of offensive weapons or to make sure such weapons do not later reappear. However, Mikoyan visit could conceivably soften Cuban policy on this point. Moreover, door is not necessarily closed to some agreed form of inspection provided it is not limited to Cuba but covers a broader area. We understand SYG had impression Castro found interesting SYG's argument that UN presence in Cuba in itself constituted deterrent to invasion of Cuba.

On these assumptions, following are procedures that seem best after general review of the matter here.

1. In PHASE I (now). We can start

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Immediately with ICRC arrangement operating from vessels outside three-mile limit. This inspection of incoming vessels would make possible suspension of enforcement of quarantine, but U.S. ships would stay on station. ICRC, operating as agent of SYG, would continue until verification of dismantling and removal made it possible for U.S. to lift quarantine altogether. At that point, ICRC arrangement ^{PRESUMABLY} would lapse, ~~but some spot checking of incoming shipments should certainly be a part of more general inspection arrangements in paragraph 3 below.~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

2. In PHASE II

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2. In PHASE II (beginning when Soviets say they are out of Cuba and ~~winding~~ with international certification through Security Council that they are indeed out, we have two alternatives for inspection, depending on whether Cuba cooperates or not.

a. If Cuba does not cooperate, we should call a meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States, acting as its Organ of Consultation, to pass a resolution explicitly recommending to OAS members that they undertake "such aerial and other appropriate surveillance of Cuba as may be necessary to assure that all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability are dismantled and withdrawn from Cuba and that such weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba." This would provide an OAS umbrella for the heavy air reconnaissance which will be required in absence ground inspection to give OAS members, including U.S., reasonable assurance that Soviets have done what they said they would do.

b. If Cuba does cooperate, UNSYG would place in Cuba a UN presence to conduct ground inspection along lines of general negotiating instructions (paragraph 6 of Department's 1147). As indicated in those instructions, systematic aerial reconnaissance would be necessary part of process in this period, and we should encourage SYG to develop capability to do all or part of necessary aerial surveillance.

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3. At the end of Phase II, the Security Council would meet and confirm dismantling and removal based on SYG's report (see ANNEX A). Again in this phase, we have two alternatives for inspection depending on Cuba's attitude.

a. If Cuba does not cooperate, the OAS aerial surveillance program would continue, in order to give us all the assurance we will need that the ~~missiles~~ ^{OFFENSIVE WEAPONS} ~~removed during November~~ do not reappear, ~~in December or January~~ or at any time in the future.

b. If Cuba does cooperate, it should be possible to put together in a relatively few days an arrangement for a Latin American denuclearized zone following the recommendations of a General ^{Assembly} Resolution, which (if Cuba cooperates) could be ~~passed~~ ^{put} through the General Assembly very rapidly.

Attachments:

ANNEX A - Action by the Security Council at the End of Phase II.

ANNEX B -Draft OAS Resolution on Aerial Surveillance

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ANNEX A

ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT THE
END OF PHASE II

The Security Council meeting at the end of Phase II might be the logical occasion on which to record in a formal way the several unilateral declarations of intent which would lay the basis for a denuclearized zone in Latin America without getting the Security Council (and therefore the Soviets) mixed up with any of the continuing arrangements for assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into the hemisphere.

At this meeting:

a. USSR would make a unilateral declaration that it will not put offensive weapons into Cuba (or into the Western Hemisphere?) again.

b. Cuba (if it is cooperating with the UN) would declare its intention not to import offensive weapons.

c. The United States would declare (if Cuba is cooperating) ~~that~~ the conditions under which it expects to refrain from invading Cuba @ along lines already announced by the President in his press conferences and letters to Khrushchev.

d. The Security Council would take note of these declarations of intention and exhort all the parties concerned to behave accordingly.

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(If it seemed useful at the time,, we might also get the Security Council to give a generalized blessing to the establishment of a regional denuclearized zone, and authorize the Secretary General to cooperate with it in developing a UN presence to carry out the intentions of the members of the zone. However, it would be preferable to have the blessing for the denuclearized zone come from the General Assembly, where the general sentiment in favor of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons could be mobilized and where the implication that reports should be made to the Security Council could be avoided.)

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DRAFT OAS RESOLUTION ON AERIAL SURVEILLANCE ANNEX B

DRAFT RESOLUTION
November 1, 1962
(Second Draft)

WHEREAS

The Council of the Organization of American States acting provisionally as the Organ of Consultation in its resolution of October 23, 1962 recognized that "Incontrovertible evidence has appeared that the Government of Cuba despite repeated warnings has secretly endangered the peace of the Continent by permitting the Sino-Soviet powers to have intermediate and middle-range missiles on its territory capable of carrying nuclear warheads.";

The Organ of Consultation in the same resolution called for the "immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with offensive capability" and recommended that the member states "take all measures, individually and collectively including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military materiel and related supplied which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent."

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, on behalf of his government, has agreed with the President of the United States of America to dismantle and remove such weapons from Cuba;

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The existing threat cannot be said to have terminated unless there is positive and continuous assurance that the Government of Cuba does not continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers missiles and other military material with offensive capability which constitute an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent;

The Organ of Consultation must, therefore, provide itself with information on a continuing basis as to the possible existence of such missiles and military material in Cuba;

The COAS/OC

RESOLVES:

1. To recommend that among the measures taken in accordance with its Resolution of October 23, 1962 there be undertaken such aerial and other appropriate surveillance of Cuba as may be necessary to assure that all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability are dismantled and withdrawn from Cuba and that such weapons are not re-introduced in Cuba;

2. To request the member states which undertake the conduct of such surveillance to inform the Secretary General of the OAS of their intention in this respect and to decide among themselves on the technical measures to establish a coordinated and effective action and to keep the COAS/OC advised of the results of such surveillance.